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Abstract: The conflicting combination of Old and New Diplomacy imparted to the Ver-
sailles treaty, through numerous compromises, a flexibility which tends to be overlooked 
and which was meant also to gain time in face of quite rabid Allied public opinion in 
1919. Many provisions could be modified (reparations for instance), many delays could be 
shortened (as the occupation of the Rhineland). The treaty could be implemented harshly, 
as in 1921–1923,1 or more leniently, as after Locarno (1925).2 It was one of the few great 
international treaties which contained the means for its revision. It is not true that all the 
disasters of the 1930s were implied by the treaties, even if their legacy was much more 
short-lived and less successful than that of the Vienna Congress.
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Concert of Europe
From the beginning the “peacemakers” of 1919 worked according to two dif-ferent scripts. France was finally chosen as the host country (President Wil-
son would have preferred Geneva…) and thus the Quai d’Orsay was in charge 
of organising and presiding over the event. French diplomats went back to the 
precedent of European Congresses since Vienna, and suggested in December 
1918 a framework which was not much different from, and fully consistent with, 
the traditions and methods of the Concert of Europe: after a short negotiation 
between the main Allies the most important clauses of the future peace treaties, 
and particularly the territorial ones, would be decided and forced upon the Ger-
mans and their allies as “Peace preliminaries” enforcing a new European balance, 
along the lines of Europe’s diplomatic tradition. But then a longer negotiation, 
including the minor allies and the former enemies on equal footing with the 
“Principal Powers”, as they were called, would settle all the remaining questions 
* georges-henri.soutou@wanadoo.fr
1 Gerd Krumeich and Joachim Schröder, eds., Der Schatten des Weltkrieges. Die Ruhrbeset-
zung 1923 (Essen: Klartext, 2004).
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and all the complex details. Keeping in mind the old German proverb according 
to which details are the favourite abode of the Devil…3
Wilson had other views: the main thing was not so much to settle old ac-
counts or to repair ancient grievances, and to satisfy the victors, but to establish 
a lasting peace based on the Fourteen Points and the “New Diplomacy”. And 
creating a foremost vehicle for peacekeeping, not through the traditional, secret 
and slow, diplomacy of the European concert, but through a permanent League 
of Nations, “openly arriving at open covenants” and guaranteeing all countries, 
big or small, protection against aggression. Besides, the roots of war would be 
eliminated by reaching a peace settlement giving all nations borders they could 
accept and excluding all forms of discrimination, including economic ones. Po-
tential differences would be evoked, discussed and arbitrated at the League.
Let us note here that if most professional diplomats and European politi-
cians were still thinking in terms of balance of power and consultations among 
major powers, Wilson was not alone, by far, in defending a New Diplomacy and 
the concept of collective security: since the end of the preceding century a new 
breed of politicians, experts and jurists had developed such ideas in the context 
of the two Peace conferences at The Hague.4 Belgian journals of International 
Law were particularly involved in exploring new ways of maintaining peace, 
more compatible with the needs of smaller countries.5
Those deep contradictions led to constant trade-offs between great prin-
ciples of International law and more egoist claims. The ensuing peace was par-
tially contradictory, torn between Wilsonianism and the traditional European 
balance of power. Wilson wanted to usher a revolution in international affairs, 
but he had to make many concessions to his European partners, who remained 
largely in favour of the balance of power system, despite some lip service to the 
3 Pierre Renouvin, Le traité de Versailles (Paris: Flammarion, 1969); Manfred F. Boemecke, 
Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser eds., The Treaty of Versailles. A Reassessment after 
75 Years (Cambridge UP, 1998); Margaret Macmillan, Peacemakers. The Paris Conference of 
1919 and Its Attempt to End War (London: John Murray, 2001); Gerd Krumeich and Silke 
Fehlemann, eds., Versailles 1919 (Essen: Klartext, 2001); Pierre Ayçoberry, Jean-Paul Bled 
and Istvan Hunyadi, éds., Les conséquences des traités de paix de 1919-1920 en Europe centrale et 
sud-orientale (Presse universitaires de Strasbourg, 1987); Claude Carlier and Georges-Henri 
Soutou eds., 1918–1925 Comment faire la paix? (Paris: Economica, 2001); Marc Trachtenberg, 
Reparations in World Politics. France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916–1923 (Columbia 
UP, 1980).
4 Even the French were not immune to those progressive views: Peter Jackson, Beyond the 
Balance of Power. France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War 
(Cambridge UP, 2013).
5 Vincent Génin, Le laboratoire belge du droit international. Une communauté épistémique et 
internationale de juristes (1869–1914) (Brussels: Académie royale de Belgique, 2018).
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New Diplomacy and what Clemenceau called the “noble candour” of President 
Wilson, which translates much less flatteringly in French.6
The Conflicting International Visions and the Differences about the Way the 
Conference Should be Managed Led to a Flawed System of Negotiation
It is necessary to keep in mind that, whatever the merits or demerits of the trea-
ties, the negotiating process itself was less than optimal. The differences we have 
seen between the Allies, coupled with the fact that President Wilson wanted the 
Covenant of the League of Nations to be part of the Treaty and actually to form 
its first part, led to simultaneous negotiations about all the topics, through fifty-
eight expert commissions. They took their task seriously, but they often pre-
empted the negotiating process through their technical approach, which blurred 
the broad political picture. The principals (at the end Wilson, Lloyd George 
and Clemenceau) tried to redress that drift, but they did not always succeed. 
Each commission wanted to chisel its own masterpiece. At the end the Versailles 
treaty was a monster of complexity, and the cumulative overall effect of the deci-
sions taken against Germany was bigger than what the participants, sticking to 
their own particular agenda, realized.7
Another consequence was that it took much more time than foreseen, 
and finally there were no Preliminaries, because the Allies were unable to settle 
the most important provisions of the Treaty before the end of April: they did 
not agree on what was the most important, the League, or the territorial and 
security provisions, as the French insisted. On 7 May the Germans received a 
complete treaty, and they had no opportunity to negotiate properly, although 
they did write numerous and often cogent notes to the Allies.8 Hence the term 
“Diktat”, the most fatal of all the accusations against Versailles in Germany at 
the time.
Apart from the fact that the Peacemakers did not really agree on the very 
principles of the future peace, beyond their differences on this or that particular 
point,9 the chaotic negotiating process was also due to two other factors: Clem-
enceau chose to negotiate first on less important issues, so as to make conces-
6 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition (Cambridge 
UP, 1987).
7 That point was made by Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (New York: Grosset & Dun-
lop, 1974). Olivier Lowczyk, La fabrique de la paix. Du Comité d’études à la Conférence de la 
Paix, l’élaboration par la France des traités de la Première Guerre mondiale (Paris: Economica, 
2010).
8 Peter Krüger, Deutschland und die Reparationen 1918/19 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-An-
stalt, 1973).
9 Boemecke, Feldmann and Glaser, eds., The Treaty of Versailles; MacMillan, Peacemakers.
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sions and thus garner goodwill for his views when more important topics came 
on the table. Needless to say it was futile and clogged the proceedings. That he 
chose that self-defeating tactic was a pity, because he was one of the few states-
men present to understand all the issues: even when he did not agree with Wil-
son or Lloyd George, at least he understood what they wanted.
Another factor was that there was no Friedrich von Gentz organizing 
the conference this time: the secretary of the Conference, the French diplomat 
Dutasta, was not up to his task and he was unable to coordinate the work of the 
fifty-six commissions.10
The Wilsonian Aspect of the Treaties
At the time, disillusioned supporters of President Wilson tended to feel he had 
been outwitted by the European Allies. In my view, it is an excessive claim. Wil-
son managed to put his imprint on much of the treaties: creation of the League 
of Nations; international recognition of self-determination (through the stipu-
lation of many plebiscites) for the first time since the Franco-Sardinian Torino 
Treaty of 1860; rejection of the notion of war costs imposed on the vanquished 
and the adoption instead of the principle of reparations by the party responsible 
for the war; internationally supervised duties of the colonial powers towards the 
indigenous populations.
A major Wilsonian imprint was probably the notion (not formally stated 
in the treaties, but actually pervasive) that the new European order should rest 
on democratic Nation-States. The Big Three and also the leaders of the new, 
reborn or extended countries in Central Europe agreed on this. It had been a 
major insight since 1848, and again in the years preceding the Great War, that 
national independence and democracy belonged to each other.11
President Wilson and his team were perfectly aware of the failures of the 
Treaty. But he was confident he could rely on American economic might after 
the war (and use the lever of inter-allied debts) in order to redress some glaring 
problems, like the Reparations settlement, the permanent trade discrimination 
against Germany, and the failure to admit Germany to the League as soon as 
peace was achieved. The failure of the Senate to ratify the Treaty (which I be-
lieve could have been avoided if Wilson had been more accommodating with 
Senator Lodge, who was willing to deal…) thus truncated the American role 
after 1919, with grim consequences.
10 Jules Laroche, Au Quai d’Orsay avec Briand et Poincaré 1913–1926 (Paris: Hachette, 1957).
11 Dusan Batakovic, Les sources françaises de la démocratie serbe (1804–1914) (Paris: CNRS 
Editions, 2013). 
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The Balance of Power Aspect
But many aspects of the former Concert of Europe survived: at the Conference 
itself and later in the Council of the League major powers enjoyed a privileged 
status, lesser ones were admitted to defend only their “particular interests”. And 
the new boundaries did not take into account exclusively the will of the peoples 
or “clear lines of nationality”, but were quite often, as had usually been the case 
in the past, adjusted according to the economic, political or strategic interests of 
the victors (particularly those of France in Central Europe), the interdiction of 
the Anschluss between Germany and Austria being a good instance.
And some of the worst provisions of Versailles were modified in the tra-
ditional secret diplomatic way, following direct exchanges between the French 
and the Germans in Berlin in March. It was decided there would be a plebiscite 
in Upper Silesia and it would not be attributed outright to Poland, with its an-
nual forty million tons of coal; and the Reparations Commission would keep 
tabs on German economic life, but it would not control it as the Ottoman Debt 
administration controlled Turkey before 1914.12
In the same vein Paris had provisions introduced in the Saint-Germain 
Treaty (articles 222 and 267) which would preserve the possibility of recreating 
a Danube economic area in which Vienna would retain much of its former role. 
Evidently the French did not wish Germany to take over a ruined Austria! At 
the same time even for the Anschluss the principle of self-determination was not 
completely discarded: article 10 of the Covenant made it possible if the League 
Council so decided… The difficult negotiations produced once again complex 
compromises between the two main opposed systems.
The Case of the League of Nations: Where Old and New Thinking Overlap
Another case was the League. The main concept of the New Diplomacy was 
“collective security”: security would be from now on established not against a 
potential enemy, but with him, by including him in the new international system. 
That was the whole point of the League. Wilson was convinced Germany should 
and would join it as early as possible. But the French saw the League as the con-
tinuation of the wartime alliance and blocked that idea.
But it soon became evident that the League would at best be an 
international forum and a loudspeaker for various problems and grievances, but 
not an efficient body able to enforce peace. The French tried in 1919 to redress 
that, suggesting that the League should be able to designate an aggressor by 
majority vote, and not necessarily by a unanimous one, and should be able to 
12 Gorges-Henri Soutou, «La France et l’Allemagne en 1919», in J.-M. Valentin, J. Bariéty 
and A. Guth, eds., La France et l’Allemagne entre les deux guerres mondiales (Presses universi-
taires de Nancy, 1987).
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apply military sanctions. But they were not supported as the Americans and 
British had an international debating society in mind, not a real executive.
The League was supposed to replace the Concert of Europe. But it was 
prevented to achieve that by the indecisive stipulations of the Covenant and also 
by its work methods and its very ideology. Europe no longer had a system of 
regulation, even informal. That was probably the major failure of the Conference. 
But the Europeans Themselves, Apart from Wilson, Could not Restore  
the Former Concert of Europe
Even the more traditionally minded Europeans could not restore the former 
Concert of Europe, because some of its most important mainstays were no lon-
ger there. Soviet Russia was out of the system and very much against it. The 
Ottoman Empire was floundering. And the Allies did not really wish to restore 
the previous European system: they agreed, even Wilson, that Germany should 
be excluded, until it was fully democratized and accepted the new world order. 
But German power was not decisively curtailed: the Reich retained the main 
instruments of might in the twentieth century, its industry and its economic 
organization. The Germans themselves knew it and considered themselves as 
temporarily, but not definitively, hampered.13
The Worst of Both Worlds? Or Rather a Complex Overlapping and Evolving 
System?
It could be argued that the treaties ended up as a combination of the worst of 
both worlds, with the Central Powers being punished either in the name of Wil-
sonianism, or in the name of European balance, depending on which of the two 
was less favourable for them.
At the same time, it could be argued that despite its numerous failures 
the treaties were not a complete break with the former Concert: for instance 
the minorities treaties which the new States were obliged to sign were not a 
rupture, but an evolution folloving the Vienna, Paris (1856) and Berlin (1878) 
Congresses and their provisions concerning religious minorities. The treaties 
were an important stage in the development of the international system, and not 
an aberration or a regression, despite their many failures.
And the conflicting combination of Old and New Diplomacy impart-
ed to the Versailles treaty, through numerous compromises, a flexibility which 
tends to be overlooked and which was meant also to gain time in face of quite 
rabid Allied public opinion in 1919. Many provisions could be modified (repa-
13 Georges-Henri Soutou, «La République de Weimar: une grande puissance bridée», in La 
moyenne puissance au XXe siècle, ed. Jean-Claude Allain (Paris: FEDN, 1988).
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rations for instance), many delays could be shortened (as the occupation of the 
Rhineland). The treaty could be implemented harshly, as in 1921–1923, 14 or 
more leniently, as after Locarno (1925).15 It was one of the few great interna-
tional treaties which contained the means for its revision. It is not true that all 
the disasters of the 1930s were implied by the treaties, even if their legacy was 
much more short-lived and less successful than that of the Vienna Congress.
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